Judicial Policy Implementation in Mexico City and

M6rida
Jeffrey K. Staton Why do some of the world's constitutional courts challenge governmental authority over many kinds of policies, while others avoid conflict over particularly sensitive or salient political issues? Why do some elected officials immediately obey judicial resolutions that challenge their authority, while others find ways not to implement judicial decisions? These questions are important in understanding the role constitutional courts play in ensuring that elected officials respect a state's fundamental political rules.1 If constitutional courts are unwilling to challenge governmental authority, or if public officials are unwilling to implement politically unfavorable decisions, the degree to which constitutional courts can serve as effective horizontal mechanisms of accountability will be considerably constrained. Despite the importance of both questions, much of the growing comparative scholarship on law and courts has sought to explain judicial behavior without addressing the reactions of government officials to adverse judicial decisions.2 Consequently, scholars are left with a largely one-sided account of judicial politics that provides much empirical support for theories of judicial decision making but little support for theoretical conclusions about the implementation of judicial policy.
In contrast to this trend, recent work by Georg Vanberg integrates diverse studies of judicial activism and policy implementation by specifying what might be called a public enforcement mechanism for judicial orders, in which public support for courts and the related pressure constituents can place on their representatives may induce compliance with adverse judicial resolutions.3 On this account, public support also can provide the political cover courts require to take on sensitive political conflicts. Of course, this mechanism works only if people are sufficiently informed about the nature of the conflicts they are purported to enforce. Accordingly, Vanberg considers how the relative transparency ofjudicialized conflicts influences interbranch conflict. 4 Despite Vanberg's important theoretical advance in simplifying diverse yet connected studies, his model leaves a number of issues underdeveloped. This article addresses two. First, public willingness to help enforce judicial resolutions and public capacity to impose significant costs on their representatives for instances of noncompliance are distinct concepts. They should be treated as such in both theoretical and empirical analysis. Second, if the kind of information concerning interbranch conflict to which people have access affects their ability to enforce judicial decisions, both courts and elected officials might be expected to try to influence the way information is transmitted to the public. The information surrounding judicialized conflicts could thus be endogenous to the interactions between judges and political officials. This possibility complicates unidirectional causal arguments about the effect of information on the willingness of judges to challenge political authority and the willingness of public authorities to comply. It also suggests that political communication may permeate the politics of law in many of the same ways as it does politics in general.
These concerns can be developed through a comparative case study of the reactions of two Mexican executives to two highly visible resolutions of the Mexican supreme court. In the first case, President Ernesto Zedillo complied with a supreme court order within hours of its release. In the second, Yucatin Governor Victor Cervera defied the court for nearly a month. The difference in their reactions captures precisely the kind of noncompliant governmental behavior thought to be a problem in Mexico. When there is a compliance problem, it is not that authorities never comply. Rather, authorities resist and delay. Their behavior distorts the rule of law and results in wasted judicial resources allocated to ensure compliance.5
Theories of Judicial Policy Implementation
There are three general explanations of compliance. Proponents of legitimacy theory argue that, because the coercive sources of judicial power are minimal, courts heavily rely on societal beliefs in their legitimacy in order to induce the proper implementation of their most disliked decisions.6 Judicial legitimacy is typically conceptualized as diffuse public support, or the degree to which people are committed to the institutional structure of the judiciary.7 Judicial decisions are followed to the extent that those asked to comply fundamentally support the institutional powers of the court resolving the conflict.
Scholars invoking communications theory highlight the ways judicial decisions are crafted and ultimately interpreted by those required to implement them. The most interesting proposition derived from this perspective is that specificity in the language used to describe a holding can constrain public authority reactions. In particular, unambiguous language decreases the degree to which public officials can develop creative interpretations ofjudicial resolutions that undercut the spirit of the court's intent. 8 Other researchers have appealed to rational choice theory to explain compliance. The general proposition forwarded by these studies is that implementation can be best explained by considering the political costs and benefits associated with alternative choices over compliance.9 Specifically, these models have typically been decision theoretic. The authors do not consider the interdependency of choice, but rather evaluate how a single individual's decision changes as a function of a set of exoge-nous parameters; that is, the individual under analysis makes a decision in a social vacuum. Such a model simply posits that compliance is a function of the relative costs and benefits associated with implementing an unfavorable decision. A testable hypothesis consistent with this approach is that public officials ought to be more willing to implement changes in relatively unimportant policies than in policies of significant importance. In other words, the propensity to comply with an unfavorable resolution ought to decrease with the benefits derived from the challenged policy.
Vanberg integrates these approaches in three ways. First, he recognizes that, if courts enjoy wide public support, then the public might be expected to help enforce their decisions. If people trust their courts to make good decisions and are committed to their institutional structure, they may be willing to punish their representatives for evading a judicial resolution. Second, Vanberg suggests that for the public to enforce judicial resolutions people need to be informed about and understand the substance of the conflicts courts resolve. A confused public or one that is entirely uninformed about a judicial holding can not be an effective source of enforcement. Thus, the transparency of the conflict-the amount of information available to the public and the clarity of the legal issue at stake-ought to increase the likelihood of judicial activism and compliance. Finally, Vanberg specifies a game-theoretic account of compliance that includes the normative concept of legitimacy. This addition both allows for courts to avoid noncompliance by strategically avoiding conflict and clearly demonstrates that a political theory can recognize the importance of normative constraints on human behavior and rationality within the same framework.'l As empirical evidence in support of his claims over implementation, Vanberg provides a detailed case study of an interaction between German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the federal constitutional court. The analysis suggests that strong public support for the court induced Adenauer to accept an unusually unfavorable resolution.1" While other studies have considered the impact of constituency interests on implementation, this article is the first attempt to test Vanberg's model outside Germany.12 Despite Vanberg's important contribution, his model raises at least two issues. First, Vanberg conditions his expectations over judicial policy implementation on the costs of a public backlash for defiance, as perceived by elected officials. Of course, the public backlash parameter might be operationally defined in all of the following ways: the degree of trust people place in their constitutional courts; constituent opinion over the court's decision; the number of voters dissatisfied with their representative's response; the proximity and level of competition of a pending election; public protests or the threat thereof; and the public official's personal interest in maintaining an image as a supporter of the rule of law. While including a single cost parameter is an appropriate simplifying assumption for a general model, it conflates two distinct concepts in ways that might cloud an empirical test. In particular, distinct levels of public support may measure the willingness of constituents to defend their courts; however, they may not capture the capacity of citizens to impose the kinds of costs on elected officials that will induce compliance. Even if a majority of constituents believe that the resolutions of their constitutional court ought to be immediately implemented, this majority may not be in a position meaningfully to punish noncompliance. Clearly, it can not if elections are rigged. Also, representatives are likely to be judged over multiple issue dimensions aside from the rule of law. In sum, public support and public capacity to impose significant costs on defiant officials are related but distinct concepts. Below, the willingness to punish, in addition to other factors, is controlled for, and it is shown how the expected difference in publicly imposed costs of defiance can affect implementation.
Second, Vanberg assumes that information, specifically the transparency of the question being considered by the court, is exogenous to the interaction he analyzes. However, since information is purported to be so important to the choices political officials make over compliance, should they not be expected to try to influence that information?13 This issue is critical. If elected officials are able to frame their legal conflicts effectively, they may be able to reduce the constituency costs associated with noncompliance. On the other hand, it is certainly possible for an official to raise the costs of noncompliance inadvertently by spinning a conflict in a particular way. In fact, Vanberg's own account of Adenauer's battle with the federal constitutional court details efforts by him to convince his constituents that particular court decisions could be disobeyed, an effort that seemed to increase rather than decrease opposition to his position.14 The spin Cervera and Zedillo placed on their respective conflicts could have influenced their respective costs of noncompliance, albeit in entirely different ways. It is important to consider information as likely being endogenous to judicial-executive relations.
The Zedillo and Cervera cases are analyzed through four hypotheses on implementation, all qualified by a ceteris paribus condition. The immediate implementation of a judicial resolution is more likely when, first, the issue's transparency is relatively high, second, the political importance officials assign to the issue under review is relatively low, third, public support for the court is relatively high, and fourth, the particular costs constituents can impose on their representatives are relatively high. These two cases are similar along all but one of the key theoretical dimensions: the costs Zedillo and Cervera could have plausibly expected to be associated with defying the supreme court.15 The difference in these costs can explain the variance in their reactions. Also, Cervera and Zedillo influenced the information surrounding their conflicts, and their efforts likely affected the political ramifications of alternative responses to the court's decisions.
The Zedillo Case
In the wake of the 1994 peso crisis the Mexican economy was strengthened by fiftytwo billion dollars in loan commitments made by the United States, Canada, and several international lending agencies. Using these funds, the secretary of finance and public credit, primarily through the National Banking and Securities Commission, attempted to ensure the viability of the country's banks. 16 The secretary of finance and public credit's most politically controversial policy involved the assumption of debt from certain banks incapable of meeting their obligations. It did so through the Fund for the Protection of Bank Savings, a federal trust created in 1990. What made this policy controversial was that a number of the loans assumed under the fund were granted under questionable risk management standards and in some cases were illegal, made by bank managers to family members, friends, and themselves.17 Some of these loans were unrecoverable, and in March 1998 Zedillo's administration proposed transferring them to Mexico's general public debt.
As Instead of endorsing the fifty-nine nominees previously ratified for the first election, a committee chaired by majority leader Myrna Hoyos voted to amend the probative evidence necessary to satisfy the qualifications for State Electoral Council membership. After applying the new standards, the number of eligible candidates dropped from fiftynine to fourteen, the exact number necessary to fill the seven counselor positions and their seven substitutes. Curiously, the only nominees to survive the cut were proposed by the PRI or social organizations affiliated with the PRI.24 On October 16 Governor Cervera published the new standards in the official YucatAn Diario, and Hoyos moved that the congress vote on the proposed candidates. In light of the fact that the governor's publication of the new rules and the congress's final vote were set to take place on the same day, the nominating organizations were provided no opportunity to update their rejected proposals. The PAN and the PRD membership walked out of the legislative session, and the remaining nominees were elected unanimously by fifteen priistas, technically satisfying the supermajority requirement. In response, the PRD and the PAN appealed to the federal electoral tribunal. On November 15 the tribunal again struck down the congress's procedures, requiring Governor Cervera to take all necessary actions to ensure the resolution's proper implementation.
This time, neither the governor nor the congress responded to the tribunal. In fact, Hoyos claimed that the tribunal had itself violated the law.25 For his part, Governor Cervera argued that the tribunal had violated Yucatain's sovereignty. 26 In mid December the tribunal selected its own electoral council and required the congress to administer oaths of office. The congress again refused to implement the decision.27 On January 15 actuaries hired by the tribunal took the oaths of the federally imposed counselors and demanded that Cervera order the secretary of finance to release to them thirty-eight million pesos. Not only were the funds not released, but scores of PRI activists denied the counselors access to the State Electoral Council's official building. Effectively, Yucatan had two electoral councils.
This state of affairs continued for nearly two months. On March 11 the congress approved a proposal initiated by Governor Cervera seeking to combine the membership of the two councils. The resulting legislative decree clearly evaded the federal electoral tribunal's resolutions; however, it was not an administrative act. Instead, it established a new legal order. The conflict thus lay outside of the tribunal's jurisdiction, and on March 14 it declared itself incompetent.28
Immediately following the decision, the PRD, the PAN, and the Labor Party (PT) all filed claims with the supreme court seeking an order declaring the decree unconstitutional. On its face, the decree appeared to violate the federal constitution's prohibition of amendments to electoral laws within ninety days of an election. The supreme court's decision striking down the decree went further. Among other holdings, the court claimed that the decree itself, regardless of when it was passed, violated the very structure of Mexican federal government by attempting to evade a decision of a judicial body properly empowered to rule on the matter. The court required the governor to implement fully the previous federal electoral tribunal resolutions.
In response to a question about whether or not he would defy the supreme court, Governor Cervera responded: "How am I going to comply with the terms of a resolution if I don't know the terms?"29 Days later, the governor questioned the legitimacy of the court's decision, noting that "this resolution deserves to be studied because it contains more political ingredients than juridical."30 However, he did promise compliance. Yet by April 16, the deadline the court set for full implementation, the funds had not been released, retarding the new council's ability to prepare properly for the election. Cervera eventually ordered the funds released, but not until April 28, one month following the court's original decision, nearly two weeks after their transfer had been required, and only one month before the upcoming election.
Implementation
The Zedillo and Cervera cases were similar along all theoretical dimensions except the actual costs that their constituents could have imposed in response to noncompliance. These costs can explain the varying responses of the two executives. Although qualitative methods do not provide the precise measures of uncertainty offered by quantitative methods, it is no less important to address uncertainty in a qualitative study.31 Accordingly, at the end of this section possible sources of uncertainty that might temper the central causal inference drawn here will be addressed.
Transparency Both cases were highly covered by the media. National newspapers, magazines, radio, and television programs all reported on the political conflicts underlying the cases, the constitutional issues to be resolved by the court, the court's eventual resolutions, and the subsequent reactions of the government officials whose authority the court had challenged.32 Undoubtedly, Zedillo and Cervera could have reasonably expected their actions to be reported to their constituents. Additionally, the executive actions required in both cases were similar in substance, and they could not have been more There are at least three clear reasons why Governor Cervera was likely to perceive the issue at stake to be important. First, the preelectoral controversy had dominated the governor's public appearances and media coverage since his initial conflict with the federal electoral tribunal in October 2000. He had already defied the second highest court in the federal judiciary for six months prior to the supreme court's involvement in the case, and this defiance itself, independent of the underlying conflict, made the issue important. Second, the governor, as he argued, could have sincerely believed that Yucatan's sovereignty was under attack. Third, with a close election on May 27, votes mattered in a way they probably had not during the previous years of questionably fair electoral competition. While the federally imposed electoral council contained a majority of PRI members, it was not uniformly ceverista. Thus, some have argued that, the longer Cervera could delay the new council's ability to carry out fully its mission, the easier it would be for him to frustrate its attempts to ensure a fair election.34
Public support Since the court decisions were issued within seven months of each other, it is likely that the court enjoyed similar levels of deep societal commitment to its institutional structure following both of them. Nevertheless, diffuse public support for the court may have been lower in Yucatan than in the republic as whole. The difference in Zedillo's and Cervera's reactions may be attributable to differences in the court's support. This conclusion would be consistent with expectations, but such an effect could not be disentangled from the one hypothesized to be associated with the perceived costs of noncompliance.
Ideally, the supreme court's national diffuse support should be compared with its diffuse support in Yucatan. Unfortunately, data for such a comparison were not accessible. However, measures of how yucatecos judged the supreme court's behavior in the Cervera case and of the supreme court's national approval rating only months after the Zedillo decision are available.35 Both are measures of the court's specific support, a concept positively correlated with legitimacy.36 Table 1 shows a Both Zedillo's reaction to the initial election results and his appeal to the party's state leaders were viewed disdainfully by many priistas, especially those who believed the president was attempting to build a personal democratic legacy at the expense of the party. Representative of this reaction, federal deputy Efr6n Enriquez Ord6fiez argued that Zedillo preferred to "leave a legacy to his children as the great democratizer" than to remain faithful to his party.41
The intra-PRI opposition to Zedillo continued to build in the weeks following the election. In fact, by July 21 five groups within the PRI were calling for the president's expulsion.42 Zedillo lacked much of whatever party support he had enjoyed over his sexenio. The time for him seriously to promote policy goals was over.
Whether or not defying the court might have resulted in some sort of public turn against a possible late term policy proposal, Zedillo would have been unable to promote one without party support. Additionally, by the time the court released its decision, Zedillo's candidate had already lost the presidential election, the first electoral defeat for a PRI presidential candidate in seventy-one years. Obviously, Zedillo faced no meaningful electoral constraints; he was already a lame duck. Did Zedillo face no public costs for defiance at all? Despite (or because of) his weakened political position resulting from the election, Zedillo continued to promote his message of a new Mexico.43 Indeed, he had been championing the great transition for nearly two months at the time of the resolution. Although it is unlikely that the president's policy or electoral goals could have been affected by a negative public reaction to whatever decision he took, had he defied the court, he would have undoubtedly affected his legacy as a committed democrat. And this legacy was something that Zedillo valued greatly. Indeed, 50 percent of the president's press releases between July and September 2000 explicitly make reference to the accomplishments of his sexenio; 42 percent of those press releases are about Mexico's new democracy. 44 In the sense that a legacy is developed largely by public opinion, the president is likely to have perceived the costs associated with a negative public reaction to noncompliance to have been relatively large. An alternative way of conceptualizing these costs is to think about what Zedillo's legacy had to gain from compliance. In other words, by immediately issuing the order Zedillo could further develop his legacy. Had he defied the court, he would have forgone this important opportunity, and that missed chance can be conceptualized as a utility loss. Whether conceptualized as a direct blow to his legacy or as a missed opportunity to develop it further, Zedillo faced significant costs for failing to implement the decision. Zedillo's response evinces an understanding of the likely incongruity of championing a transition to democracy while defying the supreme court.
Public Costs of Noncompliance: Cervera Unlike Ernesto Zedillo, Victor Cervera was in no danger of affecting an image as a committed democrat. His legacy could not have been greatly damaged by defying the court, nor would his legacy be greatly enhanced by complying. The governor was widely viewed as a traditional PRI dinosaur. In contrast to Zedillo, he had significantly centralized power and thus polarized Yucatin's political landscape. In Yucatin one was either with or against the governor.
In spite of having little to lose in terms of a democratic legacy, Cervera did confront possible electoral constraints. At the time of the court's resolution, the May 27 election had yet to be contested by his chosen successor, and a majority of his constituents believed that the supreme court had behaved appropriately during the conflict. Cervera clearly cared about the election. He had fought strong opposition inside the state PRI successfully to promote the gubernatorial candidacy of his longtime friend Orlando Paredes Lara. Also, the election was set to be the closest in Yucatin's history.45 Accordingly, Cervera may have faced serious electoral costs for defiance.
The real question is how much electoral support would Cervera have likely lost as a result of his delayed response to the supreme court. The answer is, very little, for at least two reasons. First, given the kind of politician Cervera was and his five-month defiance of the federal electoral tribunal, his reaction to the court's order was not unexpected by yucatecos. Cervera's reaction would probably have been perceived as unacceptable mostly by voters already predisposed to vote against his candidate. Cervera would have been unlikely to perceive significant costs associated with noncompliance. Indeed, as suggested by the data in Table 2 , party identification was strongly related to opinion over Cervera's behavior in the preelectoral conflict.46 Among those respondents in the Reforma poll who were likely to vote in the May election, just over 73 percent of PRI identifiers rated the governor's behavior as good to very good; only 8 percent rated the governor's behavior as poor to very poor. In contrast, just over 68 percent of panistas judged his behavior to have been poor to very poor. The most interesting result concerns the split in opinion among independent voters: 42 percent rated the governor's behavior as good to very good, and 36 percent rated it as poor to very poor. This result suggests a second reason why the governor likely viewed the costs associated with noncompliance as negligible.
Because of the link between party identification and public opinion concerning Cervera's behavior, the governor's reaction was likely neither to lose him much support from his partisans nor to gain him opposition support. However, there was a significant number of independent identifiers, and support for Cervera among independents was split. Still, 65 percent of independents specified a preference in the governor's race. How did undecided, likely voters perceived Cervera's behavior? Cervera's support was actually quite strong among those respondents who were likely to vote but who had not chosen a candidate by May 5. Of undecided likely respondents, 59 percent rated the governor's behavior as fair to very good, while only 24 percent rated his behavior as poor to very poor. Thus, the voters most likely to change their minds largely approved of Cervera's behavior. Unlike Zedillo, Cervera faced little 
Uncertainty
Three possible causes of uncertainty for the inference over the impact of perceived costs on compliance should be highlighted. First, the public support data for Cervera reported in Table 2 Third, it might be argued that the real explanation for the variance in executives' responses is that Zedillo, and not Cervera, was personally committed to the rule of law and never once considered delaying the implementation of the court's decision. Clearly, evidence suggesting that Zedillo privately considered a delay but was dissuaded by a possible negative public reaction would be sufficient to dispel such a concern. In the absence of such evidence, there still may be reason to believe that defying the court was a theoretically possible action available to the president. 
Influencing Information
In order to consider how reasonable it is to assume that information is exogenous to the implementation process, it is necessary to describe how Zedillo and Cervera framed their conflicts. Framing attempts may have different effects on the costs of noncompliance. The discussion of these two cases makes this point clear. Zedillo's effort to influence information surrounding his case began long before the conflict was judicialized. Interestingly, the argument he developed in the conflict with the chamber could have served to increase the costs of defying the supreme court. In contrast, Cervera's attempts to influence information began in a case already judicialized, and his spin could have decreased the costs of noncompliance.
Zedillo and Information From the chamber of deputies' first request, Zedillo and his secretary of finance claimed to be statutorily constrained from releasing the information on the suspected trust accounts. In particular, they argued that to meet the chamber's requests they would have to violate the privacy rights of all contributors to the trust, not just Carlos Cabal. Although Mackey cited a valid exception to the banking privacy statute, his requests were not specific enough to meet the statutory standard. Thus, Zedillo attempted to frame the issue for his constituents as a purely legal conflict over a distinct statutory construction.49 The president's refusal to turn over the requested documents therefore had nothing to do with the possibility that the information sought by the congress might implicate him in an electoral scandal; rather, it was about protecting investor confidence in the Mexican banking sector. In light of the recent collapse of Mexico's banks, this argument was not implausible.
Once the decision was released, the president turned a clear setback into an opportunity to highlight further his commitment to the rule of law. Within hours of the court's announcement, Zedillo emitted a press release promising to comply in full. Moreover, he characterized this promise as another step his administration would take toward developing a fully consolidated democracy. In addition to promising to turn over the requested information, Zedillo expressed his long commitment to the rule of law and the separation of powers.50
Zedillo's effort to influence the information surrounding his case was aimed at legitimating his decision within the existing legal structure. His argument was about the law. This approach was reasonable in the context of a conflict with the congress. However, once the case became judicialized, this spin likely placed a serious constraint on Zedillo's set of possible reactions. Having already developed a position that drew authority from the republic's own institutional structure, Zedillo could not have easily argued that a decision of the supreme court, the fundamental authority on interpreting Mexican law, could be defied. In short, the spin he developed before the judicialization of the conflict may have increased the costs of noncompliance by making anything but immediate compliance appear fantastically inconsistent with the approach to the conflict he had already developed. Cervera and Information In contrast to Zedillo, Cervera began his public statements over the controversy in a fully judicialized conflict. Cervera made no effort to develop an argument based in the intricacies of the existing legal structure. Rather, he challenged the very nature of Mexican federalism by arguing that the federal electoral tribunal lacked the power to install its own electoral council and later that the supreme court's decision was influenced by political factors. The central public relations strategy pursued by the governor was to frame the problem in terms of a regional-central divide, a divide that was quite salient in Yucatin. Once the supreme court issued its resolution, there was nothing particularly incongruous about his argument for YucatAn state sovereignty and defiance of the court. 
Conclusion
Why do some elected officials immediately implement the decisions of their constitutional courts, while others delay and defy? While Vanberg's model nicely integrates an important set of insights from relatively diffuse studies, it leaves a number of issues unresolved. First, the willingness and capacity of the public to enforce judicial decisions are distinct concepts and might remain so analytically. While the supreme court enjoyed significant support in Yucatnn, the distribution of political support for Cervera was such that he had little to fear from a public backlash in response to his defying the order. The same can not be said for Zedillo, who faced significant public costs had he defied the court. In the end, because the theoretical model is multivariate, additional tests will likely require multiple observations in order to get systematic control over alternative causal variables. However, operationalizing the constituentbased costs of noncompliance will be tricky in a large-n study. While data on diffuse public support or specific public support for individual decisions are better than no measure of the costs associated with noncompliance, they are probably not enough, nor would they accurately reflect the distinction between willingness and capacity to defend a court. Voters make choices based on a number of issues in addition to the ways their representatives interact with their constitutional court. Additionally, elections are not held every week. To the extent that memories are short, public enforcement may break down. Also, there are costs associated with public backlashes that are not electoral. When elected officials actually care about how they are remembered, even if voters can not directly affect their electoral or policy interests, they may be able to exercise a measure of control over their behavior. Finally, elections do not always work, and even when they do, elected officials have to believe that they will lose support in ways that matter in order to perceive significant costs associated with any decision. While large data sets can be helpful, data restrictions may make small-n studies of public enforcement particularly useful. Second, information may be endogenous to interbranch relations. Consideration of information as exogenous may be helpful when asking particular kinds of research questions, but it does not mean that information is actually exogenous. In fact, since framing issues is what good politicians do well, it should come as no surprise that they attempt to frame their legal conflicts and in some cases do so effectively. It is clear that both Ernesto Zedillo and Victor Cervera tried to control the information surrounding their conflicts. Still, good politicians sometimes fail to spin issues successfully or, as the Zedillo case suggests, choose a frame that suits one conflict yet is ultimately ill suited for another. Future theoretical analysis might consider the constraints that institutions, like judicial review, place on politicians when they attempt to develop a coherent message. Further, judges, like politicians, have incentives to use the media if information really is important.53 Future research also might consider the conditions under which judges themselves are likely to enter public relations battles. Moreover, scholars might consider what happens when judges and politicians battle over how to frame a conflict. Are judges or politicians better able to shape a political conflict? While the conclusions on political spin for these two cases are only suggestive, they suggest a number of fruitful avenues of research.
